International Hi-Tech Industries Inc. v. R. – TCC: Secured creditors entitled to pursue taxpayer’s GST appeal

Bill Innes on Current Tax Cases

http://decision.tcc-cci.gc.ca/tcc-cci/decisions/en/item/72346/index.do New Window

International Hi-Tech Industries Inc. v. The Queen (June 17, 2014 – 2014 TCC 198) was a case involving the attempt by secured creditors of the taxpayer, a bankrupt, to pursue a GST appeal on behalf of the taxpayer in connection with ITCs they claimed were payable to the taxpayer:

[2] The following facts were before the Court through uncontroverted, affidavit evidence of the Appellant’s creditors and/or accountants. The Appellant is a bankrupt corporation. Prior to bankruptcy, it granted a generic, fulsome general security agreement dated December 8, 2001 (the “GSA”) to its holding body corporate and other related companies (the “Garmenco Group”). On the strength of the GSA security, the Garmenco Group advanced sums to the Appellant approaching $6 million. The appeal relates to alleged GST miscalculations of input tax credits (“ITCs”) made by the Canada Revenue Agency (the “CRA”) during a GST audit and subsequent reassessments.

[3] The relevant Trustee in Bankruptcy has accepted the validity of the GSA, waived redemption of the security and released its interest in the collateral charged by the GSA. A consent order of Pizzitelli J. of this Court dated July 10, 2013, granted the Appellant an extension to file a notice of appeal. The Respondent, after receipt of the Notice of Appeal, then discovered that the Trustee in Bankruptcy had not “authorized” the legal procedure constituting the appeal. When the Appellant brought its subsection 30(2) motion to the Court to seek representation by an agent in September of 2013, the Respondent advised that it would bring a cross motion to quash the appeal on the basis of the absence of legal capacity.

[4] The two issues before the Court are:

a) Should the Appellant be allowed representation by two persons who are not counsel?; and

b) Do the secured parties’ security interests and other realization rights enumerated in the GSA supersede the authority of a Trustee in Bankruptcy (the “Trustee”) to commence or continue a legal proceeding on behalf of a bankrupt estate?

On the second point, the court found that section 29 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) clearly contemplated that secured creditors could pursue an appeal with leave of the court:

[20] In the absence of any directly applicable case law to the contrary, the prior assignment of the Bankrupt’s interest in certain property to the secured creditors, as recognized by the Trustee, removes the property described in this paragraph from the Trustee’s authority: upon assignment it is no longer “property of the bankrupt”. This is also consistent with the existing authorities cited by the Respondent dealing exclusively with the prohibition of attempted legal proceedings brought by creditors and bankrupts (but not secured creditors) whose rights and interests otherwise statutorily devolve upon the Trustee and require the Trustee’s consent or a Superior Court order to bring legal proceedings.

[21] This totality of these ownership, enforcement and realization rights clearly fall within Rule 29 of the Rules which provides (with emphasis added):
Transfer or Transmission of Interest

29. (1) Where at any stage of a proceeding the interest or liability of a person who is a party to a proceeding in the Court is transferred or transmitted to another person by assignment, bankruptcy, death or other means, no other proceedings shall be instituted until the Registrar is notified of the transfer or transmission and the particulars of it.

(2) On receipt of the notice and particulars referred to in subsection (1) the Registrar shall consult with the parties regarding the circumstances under which the proceeding shall continue and he shall report on these consultations to the Chief Justice.

(3) The Chief Justice or a judge designated by him to deal with the matter may direct the continuation of the proceeding or give such other direction as is just.

[22] Legally, the secured creditors would be the parties exclusively entitled to the proceeds arising from any ITCs emanating from a successful appeal. It is legally certain that no other party could be: the Trustee has already confirmed this, as the only other entitled party, by releasing the collateral charged by the GSA to the secured creditors. Since entitlement to such proceeds subsists in the secured creditors through the GSA’s valid assignment, section 29 affords this Court the power to provide the procedural remedy to these validly, subsisting rights in the choses in action which comprise the alleged ITCs exclusively collectible from the Respondent through an appeal before this Court.

The court was, understandably, less accommodating of the request that two agents be permitted to represent the creditors in the proceeding on a going forward basis:

[5] The motion for alternative representation other than by counsel is dismissed; the Appellant must be represented by legal counsel. It was clear at the motion that the two persons seeking to be agents for the Appellant, Mr. Bencze and Mr. Abou-Rached, are two knowledgeable, factual witnesses in what will be largely a factual, documentary based appeal. Neither is, nor was, a director of the Appellant. Both were thoroughly involved in the audit and objection phase of the present reassessment, but nonetheless benefitted greatly at the hearing of the motion from the limited retainer services of counsel. Both admit they are not knowledgeable in the processes of the Court or in the methods of best framing, presenting or arguing the facts they possess and the relevant law applicable to this General Procedure matter. While representation by counsel will not only partly assist the Court’s process, the Court observes it will mostly assist the Appellant’s appeal. Moreover, the parties, who will stand to recoup the ITCs arising from a successful appeal, have not provided any evidence of any inability to pay: Chase Bryant Inc. v The Queen, 2003 DTC 145.

Since both the Crown’s motion to quash the appeal and the creditors’ motion to be represented by agents were unsuccessful, there was no order as to costs.